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Abstract
Firms can create additional customer values by changing
the visibility characteristic of business transactions. Both
visible and invisible transactions can provide distinctive
values to the customers. Visible transactions are those that
are open to the customer: the customer can see the detailed
logic of the transaction and may manipulate specific
variables to control the transaction process. Invisible
transactions mean that customers have little ability to
control the transaction flow and may even be insulated from
seeing the transaction
This paper pursues finding out the contingencies of
successful transaction visibility change by answering to the
following question; “when does increasing (or decreasing)
transaction visibility make sense to customers?” This
archival case study finds out that transaction visibility
change should fit to the need and capabilities of customers.
Increasing transaction visibility makes sense when
customers need a certain supplier’s performance and have a
confidence in the capabilities of executing the performance.
And, decreasing transaction visibility makes sense when
customers have substantial troubles in conducting their
current transaction actions or when customers don’t feel it
necessary to conduct them separately because they can be
derived from other action.

1. Introduction
Computers have taken large part in facilitating business
transactions. Electronic commerce has evolved in various
physical forms from automatic teller machine, to electronic
data interchange, and to World Wide Web over Internet.
The big change caused by recent Internet-based electronic
commerce is the lethargy of traditional intermediaries
(travel agents, car dealers, stock-brokers, and industrialparts distribution). Their turf has been intimidated by the
birth of new Web-savvy middleman (like Amazon.com,
Buy.com, etc.) and the direct connection has been promoted
between end-customers and producers. Hamel & Sampler
[12] argued that Internet is shaping re-intermediation not
dis-intermediation of retailing industry and asked retailers

to move close to their customers instead of awaiting
customers to move to them.
This study proposes a new perspective regarding the role
of visibility characteristic of electronic transactions, which
has substantial implications for new roles of intermediaries
in the electronic environment. The customers come to
possess different visibility on new transactions using new
electronic media: customers can see more of what they
want to bother with during transactions, and also customers
can pass to their counterparts what they don’t want to
bother with during transactions.
This study makes a couple of contributions. First, this
study calls attention to the fact that, during visualizing the
underlying actions, information technology can also make
some relevant actions invisible. For example, by exposing
sales record to vendors, grocery stores can eliminate some
transaction actions like writing purchase order or making
calls to order. So, people can garner two different (actually,
opposite) benefits from the visualizing forte of information
technologies. Second, if information technology has
double-faced forte regarding visibility, we may well
investigate the appropriate conditions for successful
transaction visibility change (i.e., increasing or decreasing
visibility). Our research question is “when does increasing
(or decreasing) transaction visibility make sense to
customers?” The answer to this question can help the
business organizations “implement” successfully their plans
to increase customer values by changing transaction
visibility.

2. Theoretical Background
2.1 Transaction
Transaction can be defined as “the act of doing
business” (The American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd edition).
People conduct a transaction when they need certain
performances of others in achieving desirable outcomes
because they don’t have enough capacity to conduct these
performances by themselves. From the perspective of
transaction cost economics [18][19], transaction is not

necessarily confined to the moment when two counterparts
conduct the economic exchange.
2.2 Transaction Visibility
Visible transactions are those that are open to the
customer: the customer can see the detailed logic of the
transaction and may manipulate specific variables to control
the transaction process [1]. Invisible transactions are those
that customers have little ability to control the transaction
flow and may even be insulated from seeing the transaction.
These invisible transactions will be taken care of only by
suppliers, and be regarded as an aspect of suppliers’
performances. Thus, transaction visibility can be defined as
the degree to which the detailed logic of transactions is
open to view and subject to manipulation of customers. It
determines not only the amount of information about
processes, but also the capability for interacting with these
processes.
2.3 Changing Transaction Visibility
Chatterjee [5] argues that by changing the visibility of
business processes from the standpoint of customers,
organizations can provide distinct values to their customers,
and improve their competitive advantage. Changing
visibility from the customer’s standpoint takes only two
“binomial” forms at the level of transaction components.
However, visibility change at the whole business process
level is “continuum”: i.e., the visibility of the whole
business processes can be increased or decreased by
making some components of the processes visible or
invisible.
Making transactions visible invites customers’
participation, empowers the customer, and thereby
facilitates the customers’ self-fulfillment. According to the
concept of encapsulation in the object-oriented perspective,
making visible means moving some of the supplier’s
implementation activities into the interface of customers
(making the scope of interface wider). An example of
making visible is Toyota’s (in Japan) IS by which
customers choose and specify the attributes of their cars as
if designing them. Making transactions invisible relieves
the customer from participation and thereby delivers a
sense of freedom to customers. From the perspective of
object-orientation, making invisible means transferring
some portions of the interface to the implementation
domain of suppliers.
Two different types of making invisible were identified:
connecting the relevant or subsequent services, and
eliminating the contact point function from customer’s
standpoint. The first pattern of making invisible is
connecting relevant or subsequent services to the
customers’ contact point processes by “packaging” some
activities within a visible activity. Therefore, if certain
transaction actions are related to other actions as derivatives,
those derivative actions may well be embedded into the
primary actions. For example, filing purchasing orders is a

derivative action when inventory goes down below a
certain level. However, inventory level can be calculated
derivatively from sales record and purchasing record.
Connecting all these relevant actions and minimizing
separate transaction actions are the key art of this type of
making invisible. The second way of making invisible is
more aggressive. It relocates the contact point with the
customer further up-stream in the process and eliminates
day-to-day customer involvement completely. A typical
example is the inventory management system linking
Proctor & Gamble (P&G) and Wal-Mart.

3. Influential Factors on Transaction Visibility
Change
According to the theory of self-efficacy [2], people take
action when they expect given actions to produce desirable
outcomes and believe that they can conduct those actions [2,
p.24). This theory provides two “conditions” for customers
to accept more visibility in transactions: 1) customers’
need for supplier performances, and
2) customers’
capabilities in those supplier performances. If both of
these conditions are satisfied, customers could be better off
by being provided more information or by being allowed
more participation in what suppliers do. If customers do
not need certain supplier performances, customers may not
want to bother with transactions. Besides, it may not be
appreciated to customers if suppliers try to increase
visibility of their performances that challenge customers’
current capabilities.
3.1 Customers’ Need for Supplier Performances
Why do customers need certain supplier’s
performances? A performance is desperately needed by
customers when the outcome from it is desirable, especially
when the outcome is critical for customers’ overall business.
If people believe some information is critical for their
businesses, they may intend to even pay money for it. This
kind of information can be sold unlike the information that
just supports on-line trade [9].
Another reason why customers need a certain
performance is that it is very likely to produce the desirable
outcome [2]. There is no single relationship between
performance and outcomes: it depends on how tightly
contingencies between performances and outcomes are
structured [2, p.23]. If outcomes are not responsive to
performances, people turn to protest social practices or to
be apathy to such an outcome.
In short, customers may need certain suppliers’
performances if customers believe suppliers’ performances
are critical for their survival, and that those performances
are sure to produce desirable outcomes. If anyone of these
two conditions is not met, customers may be hesitantly in
need of such performances.

3.2 Customers’ Capabilities in Supplier Performances
Psychological involvement triggered by necessity does
not necessarily mean physical participation, as Barki and
Hartwick [3][4] called attention to distinguish between
involvement and participation. Bandura’s [2] theory of selfefficacy applies here. According to the self-efficacy theory,
action occurs when people have high self-efficacy that
means the confidence in one’s ability to organize and
execute given types of actions [2, p. 21]. Asking incapable
customers for more participation can work adversely
because it only increases customers’ frustration with
transactions. In this case, suppliers can reduce customers’
uncertainties and frustrations by relieving them of the
burden of performing those actions. However, if customers
have enough capabilities in certain actions, suppliers can
improve customers’ satisfaction by allowing them more
interactions to manipulate and customize the products. A
couple of issues need to be elaborated to clarify the concept
of the capability in performances.
First, in the context of mutual relationship, the capability
in performances should be judged in the relative terms: i.e.,
who is more capable, supplier or customer? It means not
just who can do it, but also who can do better. The concept
of core competency [11] may fit to this issue. Second, if
customers have to endure huge cost inefficiencies in getting
new access to supplier performances, they may not believe
they possess enough capabilities to run the new change.
Therefore, capability is a comprehensive concept that
contains various economic concerns in the present and
future.
The following proposition relates to the conditions of
increasing visibility.
Proposition 1. It makes sense to increase visibility of
the supplier performance actions, when customers need
supplier’s performances and also when customers have
capabilities in those supplier’s performances.
Proposition 2. It makes sense to decrease visibility of
the transaction actions that customers do not have enough
capabilities or that they do not need.
In general, the model suggests that increasing
transaction visibility may be a preferred mode. The main
reason is that knowledge emerges as the critical asset in an
organization’s survival and progress [15], and that
knowledge acquisition or sharing can be facilitated by
making transactions more visible.
Customer’s need
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Figure 1. Research Model:

4. Research Methodology
This study takes the case study method to test the
propositions generated in the previous section. The cases
will be addressed in the narrative forms, so-called in linearanalytic structure. Linear-analytic structure [21] is the
standard narrative presentation, which is providing model,
hypotheses, and analysis of pattern-matching.
For the number of cases, Yin[21] recommends multiple
cases unless a single case is available which is critical,
extreme or unique, or previously inaccessible. Through
literature review of ABI/Inform and Lexis/Nexus databases,
12 cases were chosen. These 12 cases have been regarded
as representative successful SIS cases. They have been
reported, cited, and updated extensively through many
publications.
Pattern-matching is the most fundamental and powerful
strategy for the analysis of case evidences [20, 21]. Patternmatching compares an empirical pattern with a predicted
one (or with several alternative predictions). Ideally, the
comparison between rival theories is the most convincing
strategy because most case studies eventually aim at
identifying which rival theory can explain best the
empirical patterns. Rival theories can be either a null
hypothesis or an alternative theory. The rival theory of this
study is the null hypothesis which means that visibility
change occurs by luck or without any regularities. Patternmatching will be conducted in a valid way, minimizing
personal subjectivity in interpretation.
For the sake of valid data interpretation, five more
people were hired to make judgments about the
propositions at each case. All of them were MBA students
at a management school of New England area who have
majored in MIS for the last two semesters. Three of them
were males of mid-thirties (one Korean, one American, and
one Mexican), and two of them were female Chinese
students of mid-twenties. Each student was assigned to
each one of the five different cases. They were given the
brief illustration of research model, and had enough
conversations with the first co-author to clear their
understanding of the model. And then, cases were given to
them with brief explanation of each case. This workshop
took about 20 minutes for each person. They were asked to
read those cases very carefully, and to assess each
proposition at each case. All of those five MBA students
were allowed to have a week before we get together to have
intense discussions.
Meetings with each student occurred between 7-10 days
later, and lasted for about 40 minutes in average.
Discussions were focused on the evidences that help assess
the propositions of each case. This discussion is expected
to decrease the subjective or ungrounded arguments about
the support of each proposition.

5. Case Profiles
5.1 Cases of Increasing Visibility
5.1.1 Airline Reservation Systems
The airline reservation systems provide a case of
increasing visibility, which opened the internal
management information of airline companies to their
customers, travel agencies. Travel agents needed to
streamline their transactions with airline companies because
they had to deal with abundant air-flight information in a
very efficient way. Due to the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, travel agents could not maintain their conventional
ways of transaction practices for airline reservation because
the Deregulation opened up pricing competition and made
travel agencies swamped with too much information about
airfares and schedules. Effective and real-time reservation
of air-flight seats became critical for the business of travel
agency. Even after the Deregulation rule, travel agencies
were still familiar with what airline companies were
providing over the information systems. In other words,
travel agencies could still give consults or connect flights
for their patrons to satisfy idiosyncratic travel schedules
and styles. Travel agencies just needed some efficient
instrument that helps deal with abundant air-flight
information and reserve air-flight seats. Airline companies
were able to satisfy these needs of travel agencies by
exposing their internal management information of airflights to travel agencies.
5.1.2 The Union Bank Of Finland (UBF)
UBF launched the first electronic banking system (EBS)
in Finland, which covered the entire range of banking
operations. Using a chare card, customers could access
from any terminal linked to the public banking services
network. Through electronic banking, it was possible at
any time to pay bills, transfer funds from one account to
another, and monitor the status of accounts. After banking
hours, information could also be accessed regarding the
status of loans. Stocks and shares services were also
available, including the instructions for buying or selling,
and the real-time access to share indexes and company
information. For the personal clients, ATM (Automatic
Teller Machine) services can also take some credit in
improving business efficiency. Collaboration among the
Finnish banks in the use of ATMs was also progressing: by
1990, all the banking chains in Finland joined a single
network.
The UBF case provides an example of increasing
visibility, which allowed patrons to manage various
financial accounts and financial transactions in person. The
patrons of UBF used to go through intermediary clerks in
conducting transactions. UBF recognized the reengineering
the entire operating processes by information technologies
could help the organization not only by reducing its
operating costs, but also by improving its service to
customers. The new reengineered process was to replace

manual works of staffs with computerized self-account
maintenance by customers. Customers could benefit from
this change because they needed banking services anytime
(even after banks are closed) and effectively. Customers
already knew where to use their money (such as on stock
investment and on various other financial products), and
how to manage their account (such as balance management,
paying money by gyro). To these customers, it made sense
to pass the responsibility of managing account from UBF to
customers.
5.1.3 Federal Express
FedEx Ship allowed customers to complete entire
shipping transactions electronically from their desktop PCs,
including printing out the shipping labels. In November
1994, FedEx launched its Internet home page
(http://www.fedex.com) on the World Wide Web that
allowed customers to check the status of a FedEx package
over the web. In 1996, the company introduced FedEx
InterNetShip, the first automated shipping transaction
available on the Internet. By entering a valid FedEx
account number, customers could complete the entire
shipping function directly from the Web page. That
included preparing all paperwork on-line, printing a barcoded label, scheduling a courier pick-up, and uploading
the billing information to FedEx. The site also enabled
users to download FedEx software such as FedEx Ship,
FedEx Tracking software, or FedEx Document Preparation
software.
The FedEx case provides an example of increasing
visibility, which allowed FedEx’s patrons to check out the
package delivery status. Since the inception of its business,
FedEx managed to check the delivery status at every node
of logistics chain for internal management purposes using
sophisticated information systems. Capabilities required for
this transaction (i.e., checking out the delivery status by
getting access to information systems) are not that hard for
customers: i.e., they just had to remember their delivery
service ID number. Therefore, it really made sense to
customers if they are allowed to access to the delivery
information systems directly.
5.1.4 Dun & Bradstreet (D&B)
D&B began developing electronic delivery systems in
1976 to give customers direct access to the data-base and to
increase revenue. In 1978, the company announced the first
of these services, DunsDial. DunsDial allowed subscribers
to call an 800 number and get on-line access to the database
through an operator. To bring the electronic message
directly to users’ desk-top computers, D&B developed
DunsNet, a packet-switched telecommunications network
that became available in March 1985. The system originally
targeted financial departments. Using this network,
subscribers could pull reports from the D&B’s mainframe
to the remote terminals through DunsPrint.

The D&B case provides an example of increasing
visibility, which allowed their patrons to get in and
manipulate their data. Patrons depended on D&B for
business credit and financial information. They appreciated
the data mines that D&B stored, but not the ways D&B
reported to its patrons. D&B used to satisfy their customers
by collecting huge amount of data and generating report in
a certain format. Customers just received the report that
they wanted, but the contents and format were decided by
D&B. Customers, most of whom were financial
departments, already knew what kind of data they needed.
Therefore, the best way to resolve their dissatisfaction was
to allow direct access and manipulation of data. To
maximize its change, D&B itemized data rather than
bundling data at the report level.
5.1.5 National Bicycle Industrial Company (NBIC)
The first mass customization factory was built in 1987
and named the Panasonic Ordering System (POS). This
factory was directly linked to customers via retail outlets.
The factory directly received a customer’s selection of
options, colors, patterns, and models. The firm estimated
that a customer could choose from about eight million
possible variations based on model types, color, frame size,
and other features. In this factory, the production process
began only after the arrival of the customer’s order and
specifications. Craftsmen on the factory floor were very
agile in setting up each machine required to complete each
order. Customer service, appropriate pricing, and extensive
communication had to be all an integral part of the NBIC’s
mass-customization strategy.
The NBIC case provides an example of increasing
visibility, which allowed their customers to design bicycles
in person. Customers needed to purchase bicycles that fit to
their preferences in terms of style, color, size, and features.
Some proficient customers had to shop around the market
or spend substantial amount of time by intense searching
until they could find what they wanted. NBIC did not lose
this niche and developed an information system that
allowed customers to design what they wanted. This new
business process was not possible if NBIC was not
equipped with flexible manufacturing capabilities to deliver
the item in 2 weeks. NBIC had manufacturing capabilities,
and customers knew what they wanted. The new business
process was arranged to take advantage of relative strengths
of both sides. Therefore, it made sense to open designing
module to customers.
5.1.6 Netscape: Software Giveaway
Netscape announced that it would post the
Communicator source code on the Web under the aegis of a
Netscape developer group known as Mozilla.org. on
January 22, 1998. Netscape’s giveaway had only one major
condition: Anyone who downloads the code and modifies
it has to make his or her modifications available to
Netscape and the world. Developers would now be able to

modify Netscape’s code and incorporate it into their own
products. In return, they would be required to submit all
modifications to Netscape so that Netscape could decide
which changes to be incorporated into the next official
Communicator release. The software giveaway was a bold
effort to stave off failure by tapping the energy of tens of
thousands of technologists, inside and outside the company,
who were loyal to Netscape’s products.
To manage the process of incorporating outside work,
Netscape set up an internal team called Mozilla and posted
its source code on the mozilla.org Web site. In mid 1998,
the group consisted of eight engineers (six developers, one
IT person, and one tester) and one customer support person.
Most contributions from outside developers were features
or bug fixes on existing features. In those cases, the
Mozilla team consulted with the original Netscape
developer or the current Netscape person overseeing that
area for the check-in. Three senior developers on the
Mozilla team made most of the final decisions on whether
or not to accept an outside contribution to the code.
Netscape retained the rights to the Netscape, Navigator,
and Communicator brand names and logos, as well as the
rights to distribute future products based on the code. But
others could now build or distribute their own browsers
based on Netscape’s source code. And unlike most other
free software, Netscape allowed companies to sell products
based on the modified or unmodified code. The Mozilla
Public License was free forever.
Software developers apparently welcomed this move,
downloading some 250,000 copies of the Communicator
5.0 source in the first month. Moreover, Microsoft’s
decision to tie Internet Explorer more tightly to the
Windows operating system in 1998 made it virtually
impossible for Microsoft to respond in kind. If Microsoft
revealed its source code for Internet Explorer, it would risk
undermining its proprietary technology in Windows.
The Netscape case provides an example of increasing
visibility, which opened the source programs and allowed
patrons to customize the programs. There were many
computer geeks who love to manipulate the source
programs to customize them to their applications or systems.
A couple of well-known cases (Apache and Linux)
encouraged Netscape to open their source programs of
Communicator 5.0. Customers already appreciated the
innovation of Netscape, and had enough capability to
customize the programs. Therefore, Netscape’s decision to
open the source codes off Communicator 5.0 was welcome
by the customers. This new business process cannot
succeed if patrons do not have enough capabilities to
customize the source codes of Web browser.
5.2 Cases of Decreasing Visibility
5.2.1 ASAP (Analytic Systems Automatic Purchasing)
AHSC (American Hospital Supply Corporation) was a
health-care distributor company and ran the ASAP system
(Analytic Systems Automatic Purchasing).
ASAP was

initially developed in the 1960s to solve AHSC’s
operational problems, such as incomplete orders and late
delivery, especially with one of its major customers,
Stanford Medical Center. By 1980, a quarter of the
company’s incoming purchase orders came through ASAP.
After Baxter bought out AHSC in 1985, Baxter transformed
ASAP to a multi-vendor universal distribution system and
competed with other electronic distribution channels. The
ASAP system eventually transformed into strategic
collaboration with its customers, redefining the
conventional relationship with customers.
This strategic transformation was marked by the
deployment of Baxter’s ValueLink program in 1990. The
focus of information systems shifted from the efficient
distribution of products through automated order entry
toward the integrated materials management service to
guarantee product availability and information-based
logistics services. Previously, customers of Baxter (i.e.,
hospitals) had to check out inventories, search for
appropriate items over the market (or computerized
ordering systems), make orders, and wait for deliveries. All
these transaction actions became eliminated by JIT (Just-inTime) inventory systems of Baxter. Baxter committed to
providing a 100 percent fill rate and to lowering inventory
levels, associated operating, and fixed costs by developing
customized delivery procedures to each user department
(e.g., operating rooms, laboratories, X-ray units, etc.).
ASAP provides a case of decreasing visibility, which
passed the burden of inventory management of certain
brands to the supplier, Baxter. The customers of ASAP,
hospitals, still concerned about inventory management, but
did not sway a good command of it. They had to deal with
too much information of products after many rivals of
Baxter (such as Abbott, 3M, and Johnson & Johnson)
withdrew from ASAP and launched open-protocol
information systems. The economic logic for the inventory
management had shifted from economies of scale (i.e.,
automating the purchasing order activity) to economies of
scope (i.e., customized materials management), which
required more intensive information searching and
management. In addition, hospital did not feel the value in
traditional ways of inventory
management such as
checking out inventory levels, writing and mailing purchase
orders, and inquiring order status. Those transaction
actions were regarded cumbersome, time-consuming, and
non value-added. Hospitals were lack of capabilities to
manage inventories in new business environment but also
could not sustain the old methods. By the new change,
inventory management was passed from hospitals to their
supplier, Baxter.
5.2.2 McKesson Corporation
Economost was launched in 1976, and was the genesis
of McKesson’s family of information systems. It was an
electronic system for direct customer order entry, but also
helped pharmacists and drugstore operators keep track of

current selling records, reorder the right time, and have
their orders delivered with the price and shelf location
tagged on the products.
Customers of Economost systems made orders by a
hand-held order entry device, noting from the available
stock on his shelves. Customers transmitted the order
information in hand-held device to McKesson’s national
data center. The same or following day, McKesson
delivered the items ordered. The requested items were
delivered in cartons that matched the aisle arrangement and
major departments of the drug store, so no sorting was
required and the shelves were restocked with a single pass.
Electronic order entry was extremely welcome by
McKesson’s retail customers, well evidenced by the fact
that more than 99% of McKesson’s orders came in
electronically.
The more dramatic improvement was opening
McKesson’s up-to-date sales information to its suppliers.
McKesson recognized that the up-to-date sales information
had immense value to the manufacturers. They used it to
make more timely shipments to McKesson in much the
same way as McKesson had done with the drugstores.
Meanwhile, suppliers could schedule production more
efficiently and streamline their inventories. This new
system eliminated previous transaction actions of
McKesson’s customers (drug-stores):
checking out
inventories, making purchasing orders, and inquiring
delivery status.
McKesson provides a case of decreasing visibility,
which passed the burden of inventory management and
insurance claim from McKesson’s customers to
McKesson’s suppliers.
Customers of McKesson –
independent retail drugstores – did not feel the value in
traditional ways of those two processes.
The more capable approach for inventory management
came from McKesson’s JIT (Just-in-Time) that restocks
products at the last minutes when customers’ inventory was
almost gone. This new system could be completed by the
involvement of McKesson’s suppliers because it is
McKesson’s suppliers who actually manufacture and
deliver products.
McKesson’s suppliers used to be
segregated from their end-consumers (independent retail
drugstores), and could only reach them by the mediation of
McKesson.
5.2.3 Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble (P&G)
1987 was the big year for both Wal-Mart and P&G to
launch this remarkable project for streamlined inventory
management systems. In the early 1990s, the project was
finished and started to produce tangible benefits to both
companies. EDI took an important part in P&G’s strategy
of CRP. But EDI alone could not take the whole credit in
improving this process because the organizational linkage
was much tighter than the relationship with non-CRP
customers using EDI. In 1992, Wal-Mart declared to do
business only with vendors that invested in customized EDI

(electronic data interchange) technology and put bar codes
on their products. Because of the volume and growth
Walmart delivered, manufacturers had little choice but to
fall into line. The combined changes in systems, strategy,
organization, and policies also resulted in a dramatic
improvement in total order quality at P&G. Billing errors
decreased by more than 50% from 1992 to 1994, and the
percentage of billing disputes resolved to P&G’s favor
increased by more than 300% during the same period.
The Wal-Mart and P&G case provides an example of
decreasing visibility, which passed the burden of inventory
management from Wal-Mart to P&G. In 1987 when WalMart and P&G started to discuss and embark on their JIT
inventory systems, Wal-Mart did not possess such a
fabulous inventory systems. Eventually, Wal-Mart could
improve their inventory management system by asking
P&G to take over this responsibility. Until 1987, P&G was
only reactive to the request of Wal-Mart. To implement JIT
successfully with Wal-Mart, however, P&G needed access
to the sales and inventory information of Wal-Mart.
5.2.4 Saturn
The Saturn Dealer Information Systems is a network of
several subsystems: SALESLINE, SERVICELINE, and
various transaction processing systems. With SALESLINE,
the salesperson can use a microcomputer to connect to other
dealerships computers and search their inventories for the
desirable car and features.
SERVICELINE allows
customers to promptly receive information about anything
that has to do with the car: new or used cars that the
customer may want to purchase; service for the current
vehicle; the availability of a car with specific features; and
the availability of a certain part.
SALESLINE also provides the dealers with inventory
management services similar to MRP. The dealers can
carry only minimum levels of parts for serviced cars,
because they can connect directly to the parts factory via
satellite. Through the inventory information systems
connected directly to suppliers, dealers could place
replacement orders automatically when those parts were
running low. Suppliers received daily electronic
transmissions regarding how many parts had been used in
completed cars, and once a month received payment over
the electronic network. The formula of the system was
simple: no purchase orders, no invoices, no checks, lots of
trust. There was huge cost saving such as no receiving
department and no clerks to handle purchase orders,
invoices, and billing.
And with everything done
electronically, audits were simplified. By such partnership,
Saturn could reduce the purchasing cost by 5% annually.
The Saturn case provides an example of decreasing
visibility, which passed the burden of inventory
management from Saturn to its suppliers. U.S. car
manufacturers needed the function of inventory
management, but did not like the traditional ways of
inventory management. In other words, car manufacturers

could not maintain robust inventory management systems
with the traditional capabilities. They learned from
Japanese companies that JIT (just-in-time) technique can
improve the inventory management function substantially.
5.2.5 CMA (Cash Management Account)
Merrill Lynch offers a broad range of services to meet
the financial and investment needs of individuals,
corporations, and institutions. Merrill Lynch made an
arrangement with Banc One Corp. in 1976, a processor of
Visa card, to expand and diversify its business domains. In
1977, Merrill Lynch announced its innovative Cash
Management Account (CMA), an information-systembased product that provided under one umbrella three
appealing services to investors: credit service through a
standard margin account; cash loan by check or Visa debit
card; and stock investment for dividends and transaction
margins. This product can relieve patrons from the
traditional transactions for financial account management:
withdrawing and depositing money cumbersomely and
repeatedly.
This one-stop account let a qualified person, who could
afford to open an account with $20,000, enjoy a combined
checkbook and securities margin account. For $4.17 a
month, an account holder could buy and sell stocks, write
checks with no minimum, and use a supplied credit card
under the CMA umbrella. CMA account holders were
given checks with a Banc One code number, even though
they did not actually have an account there. CMA account
holders could have their checks processed by Banc One.
But it was not the bank that actually cancelled the checks,
only Merrill Lynch did for Banc One. Merrill Lynch
maintained a zero-balance account by borrowing money
daily to cancel the millions of dollars of checks. All
transactions appeared on one monthly statement. And all
cash in the account earned money-market rates. The
computer swept daily through the received card charges,
checks, securities, and deposits to deliver an updated credit
limit for each account holder.
The CMA case provides an example of decreasing
visibility, which passed the burden of money account
management from customers to Merrill Lynch. There was
a couple of attractiveness in CMA. First, Merrill Lynch
recognized that their customers do not want to bother with
redundant and cumbersome transaction actions for financial
account management. For that purpose, Merrill Lynch
planned to provide the flexible money movement services
between checking account, credit account, and stock
investment account. Therefore, the burden of account
management was passed from customers to Merrill Lynch.
Second, CMA clients could take advantage of both high
interest rates in the money market, and investment in
stocks: i.e., they could benefit from both stock market and
high interest rates just by CMA. The burden of moving
money for better investment was removed from individual
customers.

5.3 Cases of Both Increased & Decreased Transaction
Visibility
5.3.1 MSAS Cargo International
MSAS provided air and sea forwarding services for
international trade. Since the mid 1980s, MSAS recognized
the world-widely increasing challenges of the cost pressure
from both carriers and shippers, the increased competition
triggered by the collapse of the boundaries between traderelated transportation businesses, the consolidation of
freight forwarding industry, and increasing partnership of
forwarders.
To handle with these changes effectively, MSAS started
to develop UNITEL 21 since 1991, new integrated
information system for managing airfreight operations
UNITEL 21 automatically documented 16 different control
points for each airfreight shipment. As the shipment moved
through a control point, information on the system was
updated automatically or by station personnel. If there was
any delay in the shipment, MSAS could immediately notify
the customer why the delay occurred. Everyone was able to
know the location of every item of freight at any time: i.e.,
the system permitted clients to track specific shipments, a
task that used to be very difficult even for MSAS personnel.
The system could also make it possible to accept initial
bookings automatically, schedule the transportation
automatically, and obtain customs preclearance on the
documents before the merchandise arrived at its destination.
There were useful accounting features as well. For
example, because of its global operations, MSAS used 45
different currencies.
The new system automatically
translated all currency transactions into a common company
standard. Therefore, at any point in the shipment process,
MSAS could see how much that shipment cost.
The MSAS Cargo case provides an example of
decreasing visibility, which reduces all the various contacts
with many different transportation-related companies (such
as customs brokerage, consolidation, packing, currency
hedging, insurance, labeling ) to a single contact point with
MSAS Cargo. To make orders and check out delivery
status, cargo entrusting companies needed to contact each
of transportation companies. It was such a cumbersome job
to contact all the relevant transportation companies
individually.
MSAS Cargo realized it could create
substantial values by working as a close partner of
customers by providing a comprehensive package of
transportation services across all the value chains of its
clients’ business activities (from receiving orders to
delivery to the final destination).
Thanks to this
comprehensive service, cargo entrusting companies were
able to reduce lots of inefficient bottlenecks in international
transportation (such as insurance, declaration, and miscarriage).
This case also relates to the increased transaction
visibility because MSAS’s patrons got direct access to the
delivery status information without intermediaries. MSAS

Cargo could increase customer values by taking over the
cumbersome job of coordinating all the transportation
activities, and providing direct access to the information of
package delivery status. This new comprehensive service
made visible the package delivery status, and also made
invisible all the chores of contacting each transportation
company.

6. Discussion
Proposition 1 is supported by all the seven cases of
making visible. So, we can conclude that it makes sense to
increase visibility of the supplier performance actions,
when customers need supplier’s performances and also
when customers have capabilities in those supplier’s
performances. Proposition 2 is related to the case of
making invisible. The proposition is supported by all the
six cases of making invisible. So, we can conclude that it
makes sense to decrease visibility of the transaction actions
that customers do not have enough capabilities or that they
do not need.
The same kind of problems can be resolved either way
of increasing visibility or decreasing visibility. The choice
of solution depends on the context, which is the need and
capability of customers. For example, in helping customers
deal with information overload, airline companies took the
approach of increasing visibility, whereas Baxter (ASAP)
decreased visibility using JIT technology. In designing a
new financial accounts management systems, Merrill Lynch
and UBF also took opposite approaches: CMA of Merrill
Lynch relates to decreasing visibility, whereas EBS of UBF
relates to increasing visibility. The key difference in each
pair is whether customers had need and capability for
certain actions in dealing with the problems. Travel
agencies needed air-flight information, but was swamped
with too much information because they did not have an
appropriate instrument to deal with it. They had a
capability to understand air-flight information. In that case,
exposing air-flight information on line to travel agencies
made sense. Meanwhile, hospitals did not have enough
capability to improve their inventory management because
there were too many different products in the market.
Rather than being provided with more market information,
hospitals could be better off by passing the inventory
management to Baxter. Merrill Lynch could successfully
liberate customers from financial account management
efforts because customers were sick of such chores. On the
other hand, UBF could successfully implement EBS
because their patrons knew how and where to use their
money and to manage their accounts.

7. Conclusion
When does changing transaction visibility make sense?
As for this question, customer’s need and capability were

found important: i.e., making visible makes sense when
customers have need and capability for supplier
performance, and making invisible makes sense when
customers do not have need and capability for their own
transaction actions.
This study produces important implications for
electronic commerce over Internet. The first implication is
that retailing is not displaced, but will be more important in
electronic commerce. Retailing companies can produce
added-value by changing visibility of the supplier or
product information. Sony’s web site, where customers
only can buy Sony CDs, languishes, whereas CDNow.com,
which offers 250,000 titles from all five major labels, grows
because customers have more choices of CD products [12].
PcOrder.com, Inc. allowed PC dealers to scan and choose
600,000 different parts from 1,000 manufacturers,
considering availability and price.
PC dealers then
electronically pass the order to the distributor, and
eventually their orders will be forwarded to the PC maker.
This system made a surprising success because PC dealers
can get the computers that they want to sell [15].
Both success stories (Cdnow.com and PcOrder.com)
provide the examples of increased visibility, by which
customers can collect and use more information from more
sources. In both cases, customers needed suppliers (for CD
and PC manufacturing), and also possessed substantial
knowledge about these products. In this case, increased
visibility can be an attractive feature in transactions
between customers and suppliers. Hagel & Singer [10]
expected the burgeoning of new type distribution channel,
infomediary (meaning the information intermediary). They
anticipated this new distribution channel will replace the
existing middle-men. The above rules of this study can
give a hint regarding what are the niches for infomediaries
and how they should run business.
Another implication to electronic commerce is that there
should be some considerations in interface to embrace
diverse levels of users’ capabilities. For example, instead
of just letting customers access to a certain web site,
computer interface can provide intelligent agents that help
customers filter information and support decision making.
In this case, the interactivity at interface should be allowed
to users as much as they can handle. For others, let the
intelligent agent take care. Comparing the success of AOL
and the demise of Netscape, Cusumano & Yoffie [7]
concluded Netscape missed huge amount of gap existing
between web browser and end-users, which was filled in by
AOL. PcOrder.com contains artificial intelligence inside
that recognizes which of the thousands of computer parts
will work together best [13]. Various technical frills may
well be supplied as options so that customers can adjust
their current capabilities in conducting electronic commerce.
The third implication to electronic commerce is that the
concern of visibility should not be confined to the contents
of information, but be extended to the structure or
organization of information. Information accessibility is

regarded as one of the important features of successful
information systems [8][20][21]. However, information
does not just mean the contents of some topics, but also
includes the index of those contents. Accessibility of those
indices would improve customer’s overall satisfaction over
the contents of information. For example, customers of
Farcast can use a search engine named “droids” to search a
variety of information sources. Farcast’s value is not just
showing web-sites but rather organizing an index for the
web-sites to visit. Farcast sells this service for about $13 a
month. The Farcast case tells well that sometimes the
content is free but the organization is valuable [16].
Visibility can also work as a new perspective in
identifying strategic opportunities by information
technologies. Especially, changing visibility can be used
for business process reengineering. Business reengineering
is related to changing visibility because it is actually
reshuffling the location of actions between customer
domain and supplier domain. Reengineering requires
adaptation of traditional internal processes to the new
system, which must cause substantial costs [14]. Therefore,
reengineering with visibility change relates to the change in
coordination mechanisms between customers and suppliers
[6]. Again, the same rules apply: “Suppliers release some
of their functions if customers want and can conduct them.
Suppliers take over the customer’s functions if customers
do not need them, or cannot perform properly.”
There are limitations in this study. First, only successful
cases have been considered in this study. All the 12 cases
are the successful anecdotes of using information
technologies for competitive advantage. But, those 12
cases may not be large enough. The difficulty of collecting
data was aggravated because the failure cases are hard to
get in general. Using only published data could be a
problem, too. Any extra interviews or unpublished data
were not included in this study.
Second, only the representative case of each
organization was reviewed. For example, Wal-Mart must
have implemented many similar transaction visibility
changes with other organizations. However, only the case
with Procter & Gamble was discussed in this study.
The transaction visibility model will be continuously
developed in the future study. The biggest challenge is to
test whether changing visibility helps organizations
improve. Success measures have been defined differently
in many studies: profit, revenue, psychological measure of
customer satisfaction, usage of information systems, to
name a few. Different success measures may have different
causal factors. More detailed break-down of success
measures and causal factors may well be considered in the
future study. Another agenda is to apply transaction
visibility onto knowledge management: e.g., what kind of
knowledge emerges visible, and what kind of knowledge
tends to disappear as organizations learn.
Capability in actions can be a candidate for future
research, because it is an important factor in changing

visibility. Bandura[2] put more emphasis on the confidence
in capabilities rather than capability itself. Recent TV
commercial of Excite.com promotes Internet usage by
introducing nutty Internet users. That commercial could
increase the self-confidence of TV viewers in Internet if
they believe they must be better than such nutty people.
Capabilities may not necessarily mean the absolute amount
of knowledge or experience embodied in people: rather,
it’s a matter of attitude. Therefore, an insightful study
could be produced if theories of attitude are combined with
studies of self-efficacy in figuring out how to improve
capabilities.
Last, relational factors can be included to give a better
explanation of transaction visibility change. Especially,
trust must work critically in the case of making invisible.
Customers may not allow to pass their activities in their
authority to their counterpart unless they have enough trust.
If more comprehensive factors are included in the model,
the possible clash or trade-off between factors need to be
investigated as well.
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